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Summary
Trade remedies are government measures to minimize the adverse impact of
imports on domestic industries. Antidumping duties are used to counter the effects of
imports sold at unfairly low prices on the domestic  market.  Countervailing duties are
used to counter the price effects of imports that benefit from government subsidies
in the exporting countries.  Safeguard remedies (also called Section 201 and escape
clause remedies) are used to reduce the injurious impact of surges in fairly trade
imports. 
The intense interest in the issue led  the 106th Congress to introduce a number
of bills to revise U.S. trade remedy statutes.  A similar level of interest has led to the
introduction of legislation in 107th Congress.  The legislation is in response to steel
industry concerns that current U.S. trade remedy laws are inadequate to counter the
effects of import surges.  Some of the bills would  revise safeguard remedies. Others
would change antidumping and countervailing-duty remedies.  The congressional
proposals follow different approaches to the same goal– to ease the procedural burden
in obtaining relief and improve the chances that U.S. industries would obtain relief.
In so doing, the legislation  would  make it less likely that industries would press
Congress to directly restrict imports through protectionist legislation.  On October 28,
2000, President Clinton signed P.L. 106-387, the Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001
which contains a provision, the so-called Byrd Amendment, requiring antidumping
and countervailing duties be distributed to the domestic industries originally affected
by the dumping or subsidy actions. 
Trade remedy legislation is largely supported by those industries, such as steel,
that are most sensitive to foreign competition. The legislation is generally opposed by
those industries and groups that use imports as inputs or consume them as final
products. Increased trade relief would likely result in higher prices to  these latter
groups.   This report will be revised as congressional action warrants.
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Trade Remedy Law Reform 
in the 107th Congress
Trade remedies are government measures to minimize the adverse impact of
imports on domestic industries.  The remedies might be applied to counter the effects
of unfair foreign trade practices, such as foreign government subsidies or dumping,
that is, selling an import below its fair market value.  Remedies might also be applied
to reduce the impact of surges in fairly-traded imports. While having some
antecedents in earlier U.S. law, trade remedies largely came into use when the United
States and other economically developed countries engaged in bilateral and
multilateral negotiations to reduce tariff and nontariff  trade barriers.  Policymakers
consider  trade remedies a tool to cushion the adverse impact of trade liberalization
on  import-sensitive industries and in so doing to build a political consensus for trade
agreements and open trade. 
The Constitution assigns primary responsibility for regulating trade to the
Congress, but the Congress over time has delegated– for specified periods of time–
much of the authority to the executive branch but continues to shape U.S. trade policy
by passing new trade laws or amending old ones.  At times, Congress has responded
to import crises by proposing, and sometimes enacting, changes in the trade remedy
laws.   
In 1998, U.S. imports of steel products soared.1   In response to steel industry
concerns, the House passed, on March 18, 1999,  (289-141) H.R. 975 (Visclosky et.
al.) which would have required the President to restrict steel imports to levels equal
to the monthly average of imports during the 36 months prior to July 1997 and would
have circumvented standard U.S. trade remedies.  On June 22, 1999, the Senate voted
to withdraw consideration of the bill.  In the 107th Congress, H.R. 808 (Visclosky et
al) was introduced that would establish quotas on steel imports as would S. 957
(Wellstone).  On June 5, 2001, the Bush Administration announced its intention to,
among other things, initiate a section 201 action against imports of various steel
products. 
  
On October 28, 2000, President Clinton signed P.L. 106-387, the Agriculture,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2001 which contained a provision, the so-called Byrd
Amendment, that requires antidumping and countervailing duties be distributed to the
domestic industries originally affected by the dumping or subsidy actions.  The report
examines U.S. trade remedy programs and analyzes the legislative proposals and their
potential implications.
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2U.S. law provides for other trade remedies as well. The Department of Labor administers a
trade adjustment assistance program for workers who can show that they have lost their jobs
because of imports and administers a separate program for workers who have lost their jobs
because of imports coming into the United States as a result of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).The Department of Commerce operates a trade adjustment
assistance program for firms.  Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, gives
authority to the U.S. International Trade Commission to issue an exclusion order and/or a
cease-and-desist order against imports that it has determined are sold in the United States
through unlawful methods of competition or sale or the products of intellectual property rights
infringements. Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides for remedies against imports
from Communist countries that cause market disruption. It is a provision that is similar to but
more restrictive than the safeguard remedies.  Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
amended (often more simply called section 301) give authority to the United States Trade
Representative to act against foreign unfair trade practices.  It is most used against practices




What are Trade Remedies and How do They Work?
U.S. law provides for a range of administrative measures to reduce the adverse
effects of foreign trade policies and practices on U.S. industries.  Three forms of
relief– safeguards, antidumping, and countervailing duty remedies– have been  the
subjects of recent legislation.2 
Trade Remedies Overview  
Safeguard (also referred to as escape clause and Section 201) relief provides for
temporary duties, quotas, or other restrictions on imports that are traded fairly but
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.  The relief is intended
to give the domestic industry the opportunity to adjust to the new competition and
remain competitive.  The authority for the safeguard  relief is found in sections 201-
204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.3 
Antidumping (AD) is relief to remedy the adverse price impact of  imports sold
on the U.S. market at unfairly low prices.  The relief is in the form of extra duties on
the dumped imports.    The authority for AD relief is found in sections 731-739 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.4
Countervailing duty (CVD) is relief from the adverse price impact of imports that
receive foreign government subsidies.  The relief is in the form of extra duties on
those imports. The authority for CVD relief is found in sections 701-709 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended.5
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6See for example, Lawrence, Robert Z. and Robert E. Litan.  Saving Free Trade: A
Pragmatic Approach.  The Brookings Institution.  Washington.  1986.  p. 25.
7Destler. I.M.  American Trade Politics.  Institute for International Economics and The
Twentieth Century Fund.  Second Edition.  June 1992.  p. 172.
Objectives of Trade Remedies
The three programs are designed to “level the playing field,” for adversely
affected industries in the face of unfair foreign competition or rapidly increasing fair
foreign competition.  Specifically, AD and CVD relief eliminates the price advantages
that foreign competitors attain through unfair trade practices.  The rationale
underlying safeguard  relief is that while the benefits of trade liberalization are
distributed throughout a national economy, the adverse effects– loss of profits,
worker layoffs, firm and plant closures–are concentrated in specific, import-sensitive
industries. Safeguard relief is designed  to give the injured industry the opportunity
to adjust, minimizing the destabilizing effects of trade.   
In addition to these “economic” arguments, many trade specialists have argued
that trade remedies are means by which the United States has been able respond to the
concerns of the adversely affected sectors of the economy and achieve a domestic
political consensus on trade liberalization.  Without these remedies, they argue, the
Congress would not have approved major agreements, such as the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that became
the foundation for the post-war international trading system.6   
Economics of Trade Remedies
Many  economists assert, on the other hand,  that while trade remedies may assist
injured industries they do so at a cost to the economy as a whole.  They argue that,
whether imposed to mitigate the negative effects of unfair trade or fair trade, trade
remedies lead to  higher costs to consumers.  From this perspective, higher costs
reduce the real income and, therefore, the standard of living of  American consumers.
  
Trade remedies can also adversely affect U.S. domestic industries, especially
those that rely on imports as inputs in  production.  In 1991, for example, major U.S.
computer manufacturers objected when a U.S. manufacturer of flat-panel screen
displays won an AD case against Japanese display manufacturers.  Japanese-made
computer displays dominated the U.S. market.    The U.S.  computer manufacturers
argued that the higher production costs resulting from the AD duties made it
unprofitable for them to manufacture in the United States and forced them to move
production abroad.7 
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8For the sake of brevity, this description provides the highlights of the complex process.  For
more information see United States International Trade Commission.  Summary of Statutory
Provisions related to Import Relief. USITC Publication 2944.  January 1996. 
9In CVD cases the injury test and, therefore, ITC participation, is required only if the country
against which the U.S. industry is bringing a petition is a member of the WTO (which includes
most trading partners), or is a nonmember country, which is entitled to MFN treatment under
an agreement or has assumed equivalent obligations.  Otherwise, only a final determination
by the DOC of the existence of a subsidy is required for the assessment of the countervailing
duty.  
Eligibility Criteria and Procedures for AD and CVD8
U.S. trade remedy statutes and  obligations under the World Trade Organization
Agreement require that an investigation be conducted of the relevant circumstances
surrounding the trade remedy petitions.   For the investigation,  the petitioning
industry must provide information and undertake certain measures.  The government
must adhere to specific criteria and procedures.  For AD cases and most CVD cases,
industries must go through a multi-stage investigation conducted by the Department
of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission. (ITC).
The process begins when an industry,  a union or other representative group of
the industry files relevant petitions with the Office of Import Administration of the
DOC and with the ITC.  The DOC may also initiate an investigation.  Successful
completion of the process is contingent on four affirmative decisions.  The ITC makes
a preliminary determination whether there is a “reasonable indication” that imports in
question are causing or threaten to cause “material” injury to the industry.9   An
affirmative decision allows the investigation to continue.  A negative decision
terminates the investigation.
The DOC then must make a preliminary determination whether dumping or
subsidies have taken place and, if so, make a preliminary calculation of what the
dumping or subsidy margin would be. Regardless of whether the DOC’s
determination is positive or negative, the DOC continues the investigation and makes
a final determination of dumping or subsidies and a final calculation of duty margins.
The investigation is terminated if DOC makes a negative final determination.  If the
DOC makes an affirmative final determination, then the ITC continues its
investigation and renders a final determination of material injury or threat thereof. A
negative ITC determination terminates the investigation.  If the two final
determinations are affirmative, then extra duties are placed on imports to be paid by
the importer.  The determinations  are subject to judicial review.
Both the DOC and the ITC must take into account a number of criteria in
making their respective determinations.   In CVD cases, the DOC must consider
evidence of  direct subsidies or upstream subsidies (subsidies provided to inputs the
benefits of which are passed on to the final producer) and, if found, what would be
the net countervailable subsidy.  In AD cases the DOC must first determine  the
“normal value” of the import (based on the price in the exporting country’s home
market, on the price of the export of the product to a third country market, or on a
“constructed” price, depending on the availability of data).  The DOC must compare
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the “normal value” with the actual price of the import in question to determine
whether dumping is taking place and, if so, what the dumping margin is. In either
procedure, the ITC must make two determinations:  (1) Is the domestic industry being
materially injured or facing a threat of material injury?  (2) Are the imports in question
a cause of the material injury.  U.S. law establishes timeframes within which the
respective agencies must make their determinations.  
Eligibility Criteria and Procedures for Safeguard  Relief
The process for safeguard relief begins when ITC receives a petition from
representatives of an industry (firms, association, unions, etc) alleging that imports of
a like product as produced by the industry have surged at such a rate as to be a
“substantial cause” of  “serious injury” or the threat thereof.  The ITC may also
initiate an investigation on its own accord or as a result of a request from the
President, the United States Trade Representative (USTR),  the Senate Finance
Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee.
In the meantime, U.S. law encourages the domestic industry to submit a plan
stipulating how it would use the relief, if granted, to make adjustments to become
more competitive.  In conducting its investigation, the ITC must consider the state of
the domestic industry including a number of factors listed in the statute.  If the ITC
determines in the affirmative, it recommends appropriate remedial measures which
must be an increase in tariffs on that product, a tariff-rate quota, a quantitative
restriction, trade adjustment assistance, or a combination thereof.
The ITC submits its recommendation to the President who must decide whether
to take the recommended action, an alternative action, or no action at all.  In making
his decision, the President must consider a number of factors, including the industry’s
adjustment plan if submitted, the probable effectiveness of remedial action to promote
adjustment, the national economic interest and the national security interest.  U.S. law
requires the ITC to make its respective determinations within specified timeframes.
The President must report to Congress on the action he will take.  If he decides
to take action other than that recommended by the ITC, or to take no action, the
Congress may direct him to implement the remedy recommended by the ITC by
enacting a joint resolution of disapproval of his proposed action.
Comparison of Injury Thresholds and Procedures 
Procedures and injury thresholds applied in safeguard determinations are higher
and stricter than in the those applied in AD and CVD cases. The former  require that
the imports be a “substantial” cause or threat of “serious injury.”  “Substantial cause”
is  defined in law as “a cause which is important and not less than any other cause.”
Serious injury is one that is a significant, overall impairment to the position of the
domestic industry. AD and CVD statutes require the determination of “material
injury” defined as injury which is “not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”
And AD and CVD statutes require that the injury occur “by reason of” the dumped
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10Bhala, Raj and Kevin Kennedy.  World Trade Law.  Lexis Law Publishing.  Charlottesville,
VA. 1998.  p. 882-883. 
11Figures derived from data compiled by U.S. Department of Commerce.  International Trade
Administration.
12Mastel, Greg.  Section 201: Revitalizing the Forgotten Trade Law.  Center for National
Policy.  Washington.  November 1999.  p. 7.  
13Destler, I.M.  American Trade Politics. Institute for International Economics.  Washington.
p. 165-169.  
14The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-465).
or subsidized imports, a less precise and lower causation threshold than under the
safeguard statute.10  
In addition to stricter causation and injury standards, safeguard  relief requires
that final decisions be made at a higher policy level–the President– than in the AD and
CVD.  In addition, the President has wide discretion as to which safeguard  relief to
implement,  including taking no action. On the other hand, no discretion exists in
CVD and AD cases– relief as determined by the DOC is implemented by a DOC
antidumping or countervailing duty order without Presidential involvement.
The higher injury thresholds and more demanding procedures for safeguard
relief reflect the fact the procedures involve fairly traded imports from all sources.
In addition, the impact on overall U.S. national interests would likely be greater than
in the case of AD and CVD determinations.   
The stricter standards and procedures are probably a significant reason why U.S.
industries have used and received relief much more often from AD and CVD
programs than safeguard.  Between 1984 and 1999, 322 AD cases and 106 CVD
cases resulted in relief.11   Whereas during the same period, only five safeguard cases
resulted in relief.12   But the higher standards have also led to criticisms that U.S.
safeguard relief does not meet the needs of U.S. import-sensitive industries and,
therefore, must be reformed.  
Changes in Trade Remedy Laws
The Congress has amended U.S. trade remedy statutes over the years largely in
response to industry concerns that the remedy procedures were not adequately
meeting their needs.  In general, Congress has amended criteria for determining injury
which made it more likely that determinations would be made  in favor of the
petitioning industry and has shortened the timeframes for agencies to make
determinations.13  The Congress has comprehensively amended trade remedy laws
most recently with legislation to implement the Uruguay Round agreements under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.14  Specifically, the amendments brought
U.S. laws into conformity with the multilateral WTO agreements on antidumping,
subsidies/countervailing,  and safeguard procedures.
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15The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures , which went
into effect on January 1, 1995, replaced the Subsidies Code under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was negotiated during the Tokyo Round negotiations and
went into effect in 1979.
16The Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement (agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 , which went into effect on January 1,
1995, replaced the GATT Antidumping Code, which was negotiated during the Tokyo Round
negotiations and went into effect in 1979.
U.S. International Obligations
AD, CVD and safeguard  remedies reflect and are subject to U.S. international
rules established under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The United States and other WTO
members must adhere to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, which delineates definitions, procedures, and other criteria
for member CVD programs.15  For example, the Subsidies Agreement requires that
a determination of material injury (or threat thereof) to a domestic industry must be
made before a subsidy is countervailable (when the subsidized imports are from
another WTO member-country).  The agreement also prohibits certain subsidies and
allows others and defines subsidies that are countervailable.  In addition, the
agreement provides for adjudication of CVD disputes between WTO members.
Similarly, the United States and other WTO members must adhere to the Uruguay
Round Antidumping Agreement which establishes  procedures for implementing
national antidumping programs, including determinations of dumping, and material
injury or the threat thereof.16 
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994) lays out the
basic conditions under which a WTO member can apply safeguards remedies.  The
Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in an expansion of Article XIX by stipulating,
among other things, sunset requirements for member safeguard actions already in
effect, time limits on new safeguard actions, and criteria for determining “serious
injury.” Before the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements,  member countries
that were the targets of safeguard  actions could seek compensation from the country
taking the action.  Under the Safeguards Agreement such compensation is delayed for
three years. 
The United States also has obligations regarding trade remedies vis-a-vis Canada
and Mexico under the NAFTA. Chapter Eight of the NAFTA provides, among other
things, that escape clause measures against NAFTA members generally last no more
than three years.  Chapter 19 allows  that CVD and AD final determinations involving
another member’s goods to be reviewed by a binational panel instead of in a domestic
court.
A number of trading partners, including  Japan, Korea, Chile, and Brazil, have
criticized U.S. use of its trade remedy laws, especially  AD, as not fully in line with
WTO rules. They argued that a review of member-country trade remedy practices and
policies should be on the agenda of the forthcoming WTO round of negotiations.  The
United States resisted this demand and many Members of Congress opposed it.
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However, in November 2001, at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar, the
142 WTO members agreed to include trade remedy laws on the agenda.17    
Trade Remedy Reform Proposals in the 106th and
107th Congresses
A range of bills were introduced in the 106th Congress and similar ones have been
introduced in the 107th Congress to amend U.S. trade remedy laws.  Some would have
revise safeguard remedies.  Others would change antidumping and countervailing
remedies.  They all share the objective of  increasing the possibility that responsible
U.S. authorities will make determinations in favor of domestic industries in trade
remedy investigations and of accelerating the investigation process to make it more
responsive to industry concerns.  The106th  Congress did pass one change to U.S.
trade remedy law. 
Safeguard Reform Proposals
In the 106th Congress, S. 1254, H.R. 1120, S. 1008, S. 261, H.R. 412, H.R.
1505, S. 1724 and S. 1741  would have made a number of changes to U.S. safeguard
statutes.  The most significant proposed change pertains to the causal linkage that
must be established between a surge in imports and serious injury.  U.S. import-
sensitive industries and other critics of trade remedy laws have argued that the
“significant cause” linkage to injury, that domestic industries must establish, is too
difficult and diminishes its utility.  These  bills would have lowered the causal
threshold to require that import surges be only “a cause” of injury to U.S. domestic
industry.    Supporters have asserted the changes would bring the U.S. the causation
threshold in line with that required by the WTO, although such a conclusion would
likely be subject to legal interpretation of WTO rules.    In practical terms, the new
threshold would have meant that an investigation would have to find only that imports
have contributed to injury, not that they are “a cause which is important and not less
that any other cause.”   H.R. 518 (Regula, et al), introduced in the 107th Congress
(identical to H.R. 412, 106th Congress) and H.R. 1988 (English) (similar to H.R.
1505, 106th Congress) and S. 979 (Durbin) would make these changes as well. 
   
   In addition, under current U.S. safeguard statutes, the ITC must consider a
number of factors when determining whether an industry faces serious injury or the
threat of serious injury.  Regarding serous injury, the ITC must examine whether there
has been a significant idling of productive facilities in the industry, there has been a
significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable profit, and there has been a
significant level of unemployment or underemployment in the industry. These bills
would have required additional factors be considered, including changes in the level
of sales and production, changes in productivity, changes in capacity utilization,
changes in profits and losses, and changes in employment levels.  
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Furthermore, under current law, the ITC must consider a number of factors in
determining whether a surge in imports has been the cause of serious injury, including
whether  imports have increased either absolutely or relative to domestic production
and whether the share of the domestic market supplied by domestic producers has
declined.  These bills would have required the ITC to consider,  in addition, the rate
and timing of the increase in imports, especially if the increase has been over a short
period of time. 
    
Some legislation would have also broadened the range of cases in which relief
could be expedited in  “critical circumstances.” Current law permits that provisional
relief be provided under “critical circumstances,”  that is when failure to take
expedited action would do irreparable injury to an industry.  The law now allows
“critical circumstances” determinations only when the cases have resulted from
petitions filed by a domestic industry.  S. 1254,  H.R. 1120, and S. 1008 would have
provided that  such relief  be considered in cases where the President or Congress has
initiated  investigation.  The bills also would have shortened the deadline by which the
ITC must determine that “critical circumstances” exist.   H.R. 1988 and S. 979 in the
107th Congress contain these provisions.
“The Byrd Amendment”   
On October 28, 2000, President Clinton signed the Agriculture, Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act 2001 (P.L. 106-387).  Section 1003 of the Act contained a provision, the
“Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset,” sometimes called the Byrd Amendment
after its chief sponsor, Sen.  Robert Byrd.  
The provision amended U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws by
requiring that antidumping and countervailing duties be re-distributed to the domestic
industries that have been injured by the imports that are subject to the AD and CVD
orders.   The provision requires the Customs Bureau to deposit the duties into a
special account rather than into the general treasury.  It then must distribute the funds
to eligible firms, farmers, or other producers that were petitioners in the original AD
or CVD cases to offset certain expenses that they incurred as a result of the dumped
or subsidized imports.  The provision was originally contained in S. 61. (DeWine,
et.al), and other bills. 
The “Byrd Amendment” is controversial because it was inserted into the
legislation during conference and had not received committee consideration in either
house.  In addition, the amendment has raised concerns about whether it conforms to
WTO rules under the relevant WTO agreements.  Eleven members of the WTO–  the
European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, and Thailand, filed a complaint with the WTO charging that the
amendment violates WTO obligations.   Two rounds of hearings have taken place
with a final ruling from the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Panel expected sometime in
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19 [http://www.customs.gov].
June 2002.18   The Customs Bureau reported that it had distributed around $206
million in offsets to claimants.19
Potential Implications of Trade Remedy Reform and
Alternative Options
At this time, it is difficult to determined what impact the “Byrd Amendment” will
have although it has already proved controversial. Trade remedy legislation generally
ignites a debate over the direction of U.S. trade policy.  Trade remedy legislation is
largely supported by those industries, such as steel, that are most sensitive to foreign
competition. The legislation is often opposed by those industries and groups that are
users of imports as inputs or consumers of final products. Increased trade relief would
likely result in higher prices to these groups.        
Changes in trade remedy laws could have an impact on U.S. relations with its
major trade partners, who might challenge the legality of some changes in U.S. trade
remedy laws under the WTO.  Along with their challenge of the “Byrd Amendment,”
the European Union and Japan are challenging other U.S. antidumping laws and
practices in the WTO.  In 1999, the two trading partners filed disputes regarding the
U.S. Antidumping Act of 1916, a law which allows U.S. firms to sue foreign
companies in U.S. court over dumping of imports and to collect damages if dumping
is found.   They claimed it violates the WTO Antidumping Agreement.  The WTO
upheld their claim. 
          
With the United States in mind, the European Union and Japan are advocating
a review of the antidumping practices of WTO members as part of the agenda for a
new round of WTO negotiations.  The United States opposes this position.  
Amending U.S. trade remedy statutes is one option available to Congress to
cushion the impact of import competition on American industries. Some trade
specialists have suggested, for example, that the federally funded trade adjustment
assistance (TAA) programs could be reformed and made more effective.  TAA
programs are available for workers (through the Department of Labor) and for firms
(through the Department of Commerce). They provide funds for training and other
adjustment measures to those  who can demonstrate an adverse impact from imports.
Many economists prefer this option over trade restrictive remedies because its directs
assistance to those most affected  and does so without distorting prices.   But TAA
programs as currently designed and administered have been criticized by labor
advocacy groups as ineffective in responding to workers’ needs in a globalizing
economy.
The Congress might also require the President to halt or quantitatively restrict
imports.  Such a  measure would resolve the immediate problem of adverse effects on
the import-sensitive workers and firms and have been proposed and in some cases
enacted in the past.  But they would very likely be challenged by other WTO
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members as violating WTO rules.  They would also reduce competitive pressures on
a U.S. industry(ies) which might encourage inefficiency, higher costs and a decline in
the general economic welfare.
